1

Residential Appliance Efficiency Standards Versus Appliance Efficiency Taxes -Introduction and Overview
Since 1975, national efforts to improve the efficiency of residential energy-using appliances have gained momentum. Legislation establishing procedures for appliance efficiency improvement has been passed in several stages. In 1975, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (amended by the Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1976) identified thirteen categories of appliances for the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) to test. 1 The NBS was directed to develop test procedures which would determine annual operating costs and at least one other measure of energy consumption for each appliance. In addition, the NBS was instructed to develop an "energy efficiency improvement target" for each appliance. For 10 appliance categories, the target was designed to raise aggregate energy efficiency at least 20% above 1972 levels. For the remaining three (TVs, clothes washers and dehumidifiers/humidifiers), the target was set at the maximum feasible improvement level as determined by NBS and the Federal Energy Administration (FEA). Labeling procedures were designed for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to implement.
The National Energy Conservation Policy Act (NECPA) of 1978 changed these targets to prescribed standards and specified that standards for nine of the thirteen appliances be published in the 1 Refrigerators and refrigerator-freezers, freezers, clothes dryers, water heaters, room air-conditioners, home heating equipment (excluding furnaces), kitchen ranges and ovens, central air conditioners, furnaces, dishwashers, televisions, clothes washers and humidifiers/ dehumidifiers.
Federal Register by December 1980, and the remaining four (dishwashers, TVs, clothes washers and humidifiers/dehumidifiers) be published by November 1981. The standards are to be designed to achieve the "maximum improvement in energy efficiency" deemed technologically feasible and economically justifiable by the Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE). This determination is to be based on seven factors including economic impact, cost-benefit ratios, amount of energy saved, impact on competition and the effect on product performance. According to the discretion of DOE, standards may vary across appliances and are to be phased in over a five-year period through the promulgation of interim standards. DOE's present plans (Federal Register, January 2, 1979) are to publish 2 sets of intermediate standards to become effective June 1981 and December 1983.
Final standards are to become effective in December 1985.
In the legislative hurry for the implementation of efficiency standards, three important questions have received little attention.
They are * Should energy efficiency standards or energy efficiency taxes be used to attain the "energy efficiency improvement targets"? * Just what are the economic impacts of appliance efficiency standards, and are the engineering and economic analysis underlying the impact estimates correct?
* What will the effects of proposed appliance efficiency standards be on other DOE policy areas, in particular, on the efforts to commercialize solar photovoltaics?
Let us discuss each question in some greater detail. The first question regarding relative desirability of taxes versus standards has long concerned economic theorists and policy pragmatists (for example, within the Environmental Protection Agency). The theoretical literature addressing the relative appropriateness of efficiency taxes and standards is instructive. In a world of full information and no market failures, the price system will determine the optimal level or distribution of appliance efficiency [12] . However, in a world characterized by asymmetric market information, Leland [9] demonstrates that minimum quality or efficiency standards are welfare increasing.
Weitzman [14] examines the use of either standards (quality controls)
or taxes/subsidies (price controls) to attain a socially desired production of a given good, say appliance efficiency.
While these latter two analyses justify the use of standards and/or taxes in certain cases, they leave empirical ambiguities.
For example, Weitzman [14] derives a measure for the comparative advantage of using price controls rather than quantity controls.
His measure depends upon the curvature of the benefit and cost functions (B" and C" --using his notation) for the provision of the particular good and the variance or uncertainty in the cost function [14, p.485 ]. In the case of using standards or taxes for appliance efficiency, the costs of providing efficiency seem fairly certain; they depend upon fairly well understood engineering calculations.
The benefits to consumers seem subject to greater uncertainty [1] ;
however, Weitzman's analysis suggests such uncertainty has no effect upon the relative desirability of prices over quantities.
While it is difficult to realistically estimate the social benefit and cost functions for appliance efficiency, it is possible to broadly discuss their curvature in an attempt to give empirical content to
Weitzman's measure. If we let q* be the socially optimal efficiency for a given appliance, then Weitzman demonstrates that if the benefit function is kinked around q* and the cost function rises fairly constantly and monotonically, then B" will be large and C" will be relatively small. In this case, efficiency standards (quantity restrictions) will have a relative advantage. If, however, benefits are fairly flat (B" is small) and the costs are rising quickly around q*, efficiency taxes (price restrictions) will have a relative advantage. The former case is exhibited in Figure la : if the benefits (B) of efficiency (q) rise quickly and level off asymptotically, the benefits curve is kinked at q* and efficiency standards will be the better instrument to ensure the optimal level. Dewees [1] seems to suggest that benefits do rise rapidly with respect to efficiency and then level off. If costs in the relevant range rise more steadily, then Figure la obtains and efficiency standards would be desirable.
Figure lb exhibits the shapes of the benefit and cost functions when costs are kinked and benefits rise smoothly. This case would obtain if the costs of increased efficiency rise slowly for certain levels and then rise abruptly as efficiency becomes more difficult to produce -i.e., near the technologically maximum levels of efficiency. In this case, efficiency taxes would be optimal.
A more realistic case seems to be that found in Figure lc .
The benefits curve rises quickly to qb but then levels off fairly rapidly while the cost curve rises fairly steadily to qc, the approximate level of technically achievable efficiency. Beyond qC, costs rise very steeply. In this example, the optimum level will be either q or qC. If q < qb, then q is the optimum and efficiency taxes are optimal.
If qb < q, then the relative desirability of standards versus taxes depends upon whether qb or q is optimal the level q*. That will depend not only upon local curvature, but also upon the entire schedule of B and C. As drawn in c, q = q* and efficiency standards are optimal.
The second question is more empirical in nature; it concerns the estimated impacts of the appliance efficiency standards. The standards are to be set at the maximum level deemed technologically feasible as long as they are economically justifiable. Some studies have assessed the effects and the cost/benefit characteristics of proposed standards [7] . However, I know of no study that has incorporated DOE estimates of maximum feasible efficiency improvements in order to assess the economic effects and compare them to effects generated by other plausible scenarios. Likewise, I know of no study that has examined the realism of DOE estimates of maximum appliance efficiency gains.
The third question emphasizes the need for DOE to understand the interrelationships between their dispersed energy policies. Appliance efficiency standards will have impacts upon residential demand for appliances using natural gas, oil and electricity; furthermore, such standards will affect appliance utilization. Such effects will directly impact electricity demand within a given household and 
1) Residential Energy Demand and Models of It
In order to analyze and predict the effects of appliance efficiency standards in the residential sector, it is necessary to understand the nature and determinants of residential energy demand, to understand how standards will alter that demand behavior, and to incorporate that understanding into models for policy prediction.
Residential energy demand is derived from the demand for the services provided by an energy source in conjunction with the appliances used with that energy source. Any analysis of energy demand must, therefore, deal with the fact that fuels and fuel using appliances are combined in varying ways to produce a particular residential service. This appliance demand behavior is composed of three decisions:
1) The decision to buy an energy-using appliance, capable of providing a particular comfort service (e.g., cooking, heating, lighting, air conditioning, etc.)
2) The decision concerning the technical characteristics of the appliance, the fuel to be used by the appliance and whether the appliance embodies a new technology.
3) Given the purchase of an appliance, the decision about the frequency and intensity of use.
These decisions span the short run (when the appliance stock is fixed) and the long run (when the size and characteristics of the appliance stock are variable).
A model of these three decisions will predict appliance purchase and use and can assess new technology potential when the new technologies are embodied into end-use appliances, such as heat pumps, solar thermal water heaters and solar thermal space heaters. For some new technologies, such as solar photovoltaics, a fourth decision (long-run) must be modeled:
4) The decision concerning how to provide a particular energy source. For electricity, the decision concerns the extent to which solar photovoltaics (PV) should be used to supply electricity.
The second decision focuses upon appliance purchase; conditional on the initial cost of an appliance, the cost of operating it, and the discount rate of the household, residential consumers will decide how efficient the appliance should be [3] . This decision can be left to the household, or the government can impose efficiency standards on the types of appliances purchased.
The third decision focuses on appliance use; utilization can be left to market conditions or the government can impose utilization decisions such as thermostat controls.
The fourth decision is determined by the household trade-off between the increased capital costs of PV installations and the consequential decreased operating costs. This decision depends upon the level of electricity use, the cost of grid electricity, and the discount rate of the household.
Different types of residential energy demand models have been utilized to capture the first three decisions. The last decision has only been incorporated recently [5] . The history of these models has evidenced an evolution from aggregate, static, equilibrium specifications to dynamic, multi-equation specifications disaggregated by the end-use of appliance, such as space heating, water heating, dishwashing, etc. (see [4] ). The aggregate static models have generally related energy demand to trends in energy prices and to changes in income levels. While these aggregate, static models proved to be historically useful tools for energy demand analysis, they have become less useful for several reasons. The most important reasons are that these models ignore the specific technological characteristics (including efficiency) of the fuel-burning appliance stock and that they do not explicitly treat the differences between long-run and short-run energy demand indicated in the three residential demand decisions.
The aggregate models fail to analyze the relationship of energy demand to the demand for the appliance stock required to burn that energy. They cannot be used to explicitly assess the potential penetration of new energy technologies, the consumer response to mandated conservation and appliance efficiency regulations, changes in patterns of appliance utilization, and/or changes in patterns of appliance purchase and retirement.
To remedy these observed deficiencies, dynamic partial-adjustment models were developed. These models make more explicit the interactive nature of the demand for energy and its requisite energy-burning capital. As energy demand (Decision 3) responds to changing economic conditions, the fixed capital stock cannot adjust as rapidly While partial adjustment models admit to the differences between short-run and long-run demand, they do not treat, formally, Decisions 1-3; nor do they treat the characteristics of the appliance stock (e.g., efficiency), the presence of new technologies and the potential for standards affecting appliance efficiency or use.
To overcome these remaining deficiencies, multi-equation, dynamic
end-use models have been developed which characterize the frontier of energy demand models (see [4] ). These models explicitly recognize the different behavioral characteristics of short-and long-run energy demand and they incorporate, to varying degrees, the technological characteristics of the energy-burning appliance stock. To accomplish this, the models use separate equations for the short run and long run.
In the short run, the energy-using appliance stock is fixed in size and technological characteristics (e.g., efficiency); therefore,
the short-run equations analyze demand as the utilization of the fixed appliance stock. In the long run, the size and technological characteristics of the appliance stock can change as a result of behavioral decisions and/or mandated appliance standards; the long-run equations of the multi-equation end-use models treat this explicitly.
Using the notation of the multi-equation end-use models for decisions 1-3 (see [4] ); we have qt= qt* Ut(Pt Yt, wt set)Kt (la)
In words, equation (la) indicates actual short-run fuel demand (qt)
is equal to desired short-run fuel demand (qt*), which are both expressed as the utilization (Ut) of a given appliance stock (Kt). The appliance stock is considered fixed in size and characteristics during the period t. Both efficiency taxes and standards will generate differential impacts on the demand for appliances and fuels. As a result, they will affect decision 4, which is given functional specification in In light of the mandate given the Secretary, I examine the effects of the "maximum improvement" currently deemed technologically feasible. While simulating these effects, this section compares them to appliance efficiencies chosen by the residential sector under several alternative scenarios: a baseline scenario which assumes fuel price increases predicted by DOE and the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) for 1976-2000 [7] ; a fuel tax scenario, which differs from the baseline by the imposition of a 100% fuel tax on electricity, gas, and oil; and a "rational household choice" scenario which differs from the baseline in that households are assumed to use the true cost of capital when deciding on appliance efficiencies. The energy demand implied by each of these scenarios is estimated. Finally, the appliance efficiency tax required to achieve DOE standards is estimated. For a full discussion of the price assumptions underlying the baseline scenario, the reader should consult [7] . Using 1975 shipment levels 1 , the efficiencies in Table 1 are aggregated to the end-use categories in Table II . It is these estimates of maximum technologically feasible efficiency levels that I shall examine as potential standards.
Before assessing the impacts of these standards on residential energy demand, it is useful to comment upon the patterns found in Table II . The potential for efficiency increases seem to be much smaller for space conditioning appliances than for ranges, water heaters, clothes dryers, refrigerators and freezers. The potential space heating efficiency increases are on the order 2 of 2%; furthermore, the single large increase for oil furnaces may be due to the use of two different efficiency measures. There is room for large efficiency increases in gas ranges and water heaters, due to changes in the pilot light system. The large increases in efficiency in refrigerators, freezers and ranges are possible as consumers move to better insulated 1 Over time, the relative appliance shipments will presumably change toward more efficient appliances (within an end use) thereby rendering the estimated average standards in Table II conservative. I do not attempt to approximate such compositional shifts here; the percentage efficiency increase in Table II measures the increase in mean efficiency with compositional effects assumed constant. Let us now turn to the impacts of these standards on residential energy demand and compare those impacts to impacts generated by the three alternative scenarios. To that end, Table III ranges/stoves will be only 4.8% more efficient.
In Table IIIb) be approximately 38% more efficient at the mean. Electrical stoves/ ranges will be 9% more efficient while such gas appliances will be 35% more efficient. Table IIIc ) presents estimates of appliance efficiencies when consumers make rational choices, responding to the true cost of capital rather than discount rates well above the true cost of capital.
Hausman [6] and other authors have discussed (and empirically corroborated) the fact that consumers demonstrate effective discount rates well above actual costs of capital; the effect of such discount rates is to bias consumer choice to less efficient, energy intensive appliances. Because such high discount rates have characterized past residential consumer choice, they are incorporated into the baseline results. However, the Oak Ridge model structure can be easily alteredl to approximately incorporate the true cost of capital See [8] , pp. 39-44. In the notation of [8] values of n=10 and n=15 were incorporated to make the actual choice approximately equal to the optimal choice. Values of n>15 generated nonsensical results. 26 into household efficiency decisions. When that is done, the results in Table IIIc) obtain. As expected, the efficiency increases suggested by such rational consumer behavior are all above baseline increases, the increases for electric space heating (32%), room air conditioning (28%), electric water heaters (13%), and refrigerators/freezers (40-42%) are substantially above baseline. Furthermore, the efficiency results are greater than those suggested by a 100% fuel tax in 5 categories and fairly close in the remaining 6 categories.
Thus, any educational or informational program would be quite effective if the program could effectively eliminate the difference between consumer discount rates and the true cost of capital when the difference is due to consumer ignorance.
Using these three scenarios as background, let us finally turn to the appliance efficiency standards suggested in Table II. Table   IIId) increase estimated in the fuel tax and the "rational consumer choice" scenarios. Increases larger than 2% are probable due to the compositional changes in the air conditioners purchased; that is, the distribution of efficiencies will most probably be skewed toward greater efficiency over the 1975-2000. However, it is unclear that compositional effects will raise mean efficiency increases to the 20-30% levels. These large disparities between the standards and the simulation results for space conditioning appliances suggest that the DOE engineering estimates of maximum technologically achievable efficiency standards are extremely conservativeand in need of review.
The efficiency results for the remaining end-uses are more plausible. The imposition of maximum technologically achievable standards raise water heater efficiencies 10, 25, and 8% for electric, gas, and oil water heaters. These results suggest that there is room for greater efficiency increases for gas water heaters than is generated by the other three scenarios. For electric water heaters, increases in mean efficiency are somewhat higher under the double fuel price and rational household choice scenarios than are estimated to be technologically achievable; however, such increases can be rates that approximate capital costs, consumers will not choose maximally efficient refrigerators and freezers. Similarly, rational choice generates mean efficiency levels substantially below maximum levels for stoves/ranges. The reason seems to be that for these particular end-uses (refrigeration/freezing, cooking) that the cost of capital services includes not only appliance efficiency, but also consumer luxury accessories (e.g., self-cleaning oven, automatic defrost, etc.). As a result, given a di-scount rate for a consumer across all end-uses, his cost of capital services will be higher for refrigerator/freezers and stoves/ranges and his chosen technology more fuel intensive (e.g., further from maximum technologically achievable levels). Table IV where fuel use is 8% lower for electricity, 26% lower for natural gas and 31% for oil. Under the rational household choice scenario, fuel prices remain at baseline levels while consumer discount rates are set at the cost of capital; thus, utilization will be unaffected but long-run appliance choice will reflect the actual trade-off of capital cost and operating cost for each fuel in each end use. Under this scenario, electricity use declines even further (9%) below baseline. The biggest surprise, however, comes in estimated fuel use under the maximum technologically achievable efficiency standards. Table III indicated that the baseline, double fuel price and rational consumer choice scenarios generated mean efficiency levels well above technologically achievable levels for the major residential fuel using appliances (space conditioning and water heating). Only for refrigeration/freezing and cooking were estimated efficiencies well below technologically achievable levels. As a result, total fuel use under the efficiency standards scenario is only 2% below baseline for electricity and 1% below for natural gas. Furthermore, oil use is above baseline by 11% because the baseline and other two scenarios estimate mean efficiency gains that DOE apparently deems as technologically impossible.
Finally, the Oak Ridge model can be utilized to estimate the extent of mean appliance subsidies required to achieve mean efficiency levels deemed to be maximum technologically achievable.l
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The introduction discussed the fact that either standards or taxes/ subsidies can be used to affect consumer purchases of efficient appliances. Each tool may be more useful in certain situations.
I have estimated the effects of standards above. The extent of efficiency subsidies required to attain those standard efficiency levels can also be indicated. Since mean space heating and cooking efficiencies and oil water heating efficiencies are higher under baseline than deemed technologically possible, no amount of subsidy will generate greater efficiencies if DOE is correct in its measurement of maximum technologically feasible efficiency increases.
However, for electric and gas water heaters, refrigerators and freezers and for stoves/ranges, levels of subsidies are indicated in Table V Figure 2a) . However, the household can decide to supply electricity by utilizing more capital and less grid power (through PV and storage). The technology trade-off curves ((q)) indicate the the choices available to a household where 0 will depend upon q and weather/climate. In this choice, the household will minimize costs by equating the marginal rate of technical substitution to the relative factor prices (Pt and dt)l; optimal choices 1, 2, and 3 result, involving a combination of grid electricity and solar PV [5] .
The effects of climate, utility buy-back schemes, changing discount rates, the divergence of household discount rates from the cost of capital, the scale of electricity demand, and changing the price of electricity (peak load pricing, taxes) have been analyzed elsewhere [5] . Based on that analysis and the insights above, we can state that the estimated impacts of the energy scenarios in Section 2 will affect PV potential through pe, qe and d. These variables will be altered under the four scenarios as in Table VI QBTU by the number of households. In Figure 2a) , some photovoltaics will be purchased; it is probable in most regions that the current technology trade-off curves are closer to those in Figure 2b ), given eb and db.
In that case, no photovoltaics will be purchased.
Whether 2a) or 2b) is the correct approximation of current technology and factor prices is an empirical matter; the effects of the alternative scenarios relative to Baseline will be the same whether 2a) or 2b) describes the initial set of conditions. Figure 2c) indicates the effects of a fuel tax or rational consumer choice. In both cases, the relative cost of grid electricity rises while the average scale of household demand drops 6-8%
(assuming the same number of households). If the technology tradeoff curves are non-homothetic (and capital using), the lower scale will reduce the desirability of solar photovoltaics [5] . At the same time, the shift in relative prices will make PV more desirable (points lc and 2 c ) conditional on q. This increased desirability will obtain whether 2a) or 2b) is the appropriate summary of Baseline conditions.' Whether the fuel tax or the rational consumer choice case will generate greater PV potential will depend upon the exact values of pe/d in both cases, the shape of (q!) and the extent of nonhomotheticity in (qe) [5] .
Under the DOE standards scenario, Baseline conditions obtain. lof course, it is possible that the relative shift in pe/d will still result in a corner solution in Figure 2b) ; in that case, PV potential has increased but it is still not purchased. have a negative effect on PV potential compared to the Baseline.
More importantly, the appliance efficiency standards will have a greater negative impact upon PV potential than the fuel tax or programs aimed at consumer information (i.e., getting d = r). We may conclude, therefore, that if DOE can accomplish appliance efficiency gains and energy demand levels considered desirable using fuel taxes or programs aimed at changing household discount rates (that can include capital subsidies), it should use those policy tools before efficiency standards in order to increase PV commercialization potential.
4) Conclusions
The preceding results strongly suggest their own conclusions.
In the first place, Baseline conditions suggest appliance efficiency choices well above standards set at the maximum technologically feasible levels for space heating, space cooling and oil water heating. Efficiency gains under the other two scenarios are even larger for these end-uses. As a result, I must conclude that DOE has underestimated efficiency potential for those end-uses, or else the ORNL model has incorporated overly optimistic technological analyses. In the second place, other policy tools such as fuel taxes and information programs aimed at making consumer choice rational (d = r) will generate efficiency gains well above Baseline (with the same qualifications for space conditioning and oil water heating); however, these policy tools will have a positive effect on solar PV commercialization potential; appliance efficiency standards will have either no effect or a negative effect. Finally, even if the efficiency and demand results generated by the standards are felt desirable as opposed to the fuel tax or consumer information, it may be appropriate to obtain those results via appliance subsidies.
The necessary appliance subsidies are estimated.
